Articles

As Chief, Magnuson Wrote Key Court Decisions, Too

"Hail to the Chief who in triumph advances"
Sir Walter Scott, The Lady of the Lake (1810)

By Marshall H. Tanick

The unexpected announcement in early March by Chief Justice Eric Magnuson that he is stepping down from the Minnesota Supreme Court after a stint of two years, evoked praise for his relentless role in fighting funding cuts to the judicial system. His chief legacy when he officially leaves the Court at the end of June probably will be his indefatigable role in successfully fending off severe financial slashes to the system.

But he also authored a number of important and interesting decisions during his tenure on the High Court. His authorship is not surprising, given his prior position and probably subsequent one as well, as a stellar appellate advocate.

As Chief, Magnuson authored 17 majority decisions as of the time he announced his departure. He also wrote a concurring/dissent opinion and one dissent. Here is a look at some of his most notable decisions.

Run-Off Ruling

The Chief, a resident of Inver Grove Heights, was not known for being very political in his private practice nor having a controlling ideological view from the Bench. He rendered a decision in an important election case in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 2009), upholding the instant run-off voting system (IRV) in which voters can cast ballots for multiple candidates and their votes are allocated according to their numerical preferences in an "instant" run-off, which avoids primaries. Coming shortly after his stint on a three-judge panel that oversaw the recount in the U.S. Senate race between Al Franken, the ultimate victor, and Norm Coleman, the ousted incumbent, Justice Magnuson upheld the City's voting methodology.

With a detailed and incisive analysis of how the Minneapolis system is intended to work, he held that the process did not "result in unequal weighting of votes for particular candidates." Nor did it impose a "severe burden on the right to vote." Even if it did, any onus is minimal, and the City has "several interests ... adequate to justify any burden imposed on the right to vote."

Finally, an Equal Protection challenge under the Federal and state Constitutions was rejected because, under the IRV system, "every ballot and every vote is counted by the same rules and standards," rejecting the analogy to the U.S. one-person, one-vote jurisprudence, and the precedent of the famous (or infamous) Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

Judge Magnuson's ruling validated the Minnesota election methodology, which was first used later that year, and also a precursor for the IRV system that will be used next year in St. Paul.

Limitations Law

The Minneapolis IRV case came before the Court in the unusual position of accelerated review. Another case that the Court addressed in an unconventional setting involved the application of the Minnesota statute of limitations to non-residents in Fleeger v. Wyeth, 771 N.W.2d 524 (Minn. 2009). The case was certified to the state Supreme Court by the Federal Court in Arkansas, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 1480.065, which allows doubtful legal questions to be certified for resolution to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The issue was whether the Minnesota statute of limitations applies to products liability claims by a non-Minnesota resident against a defendant drug manufacturer who also is not Minnesota-based. The suit was brought in Federal Court in Minnesota by a Pennsylvania resident against a pair of pharmaceutical companies.

The statute of limitations issue was dispositive because the case was brought too late under Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations, but could be pursued under Minnesota's more generous six year limitation under Minn. Stat. § 541.05. Because of the lengthy Minnesota statute of limitations, more than 4,000 cases have been filed here by non-residents, as this case. Therefore, resolution of the statute of limitations question would go a long way in deciding whether this case, and many others like it, could be maintained at all.

Because the cases were scattered around the country, the cases were consolidated before the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (MDL), which transferred the case to a federal forum in Arkansas. From there, the statute of limitations issue was certified to the Supreme Court.

Justice Magnuson, writing for a unanimous court, held that the Minnesota statute applies, breathing new life into the faltering litigation. The basic issue was "whether statute of limitations was procedural or substantive." Using a choice of laws methodology, the Chief concluded that "statutes of limitations [are] procedural without exception." Therefore, the Minnesota statute of limitations applies "to cases properly commenced here, regardless of whether those cases have any connection to the state."

Judge Magnuson's ruling contains an interesting analysis of conflict-of-law analysis, although its ultimate holding may not have much impact on the future. In 2004, two years after this case arose, the state legislature enacted a new "borrowing law" derived from the Uniform Conflicts of Laws - Limitations Act, Minn. Stat. § 541.31, which applies the statute of limitations of states outside of Minnesota to cases like this, without Minnesota linkage, for all claims arising after August 1, 2004. Since this case arose before that time, it was not governed by the new statute, but all future cases will be.

Pension Payments

Family law disputes constitute a staple before the Minnesota courts although they infrequently reach the highest echelon. One that did was Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. App. 2009), which addressed the way trial courts may consider various types of pension payments in divorce jurisprudence. The case revolved around interpretation of spousal maintenance laws and applying them to retirement payments received from pension funds. Justice Magnuson upheld the decision of the Washington County District Court to consider pension payments derived from benefits earned by a former husband prior to his marriage, in calculating his obligation to pay spousal maintenance, as well as the exclusion of pension payments derived from payments earned by the spouse during his marriage, that had been previously awarded to him as marital property in calculating his obligation to pay spousal maintenance. He also held that the trial court properly took into account pension payments derived from benefits earned by the husband subsequent to his marriage in calculating his obligation to pay post-divorce spousal maintenance.

His determination overturned a decision of the Court of Appeals, which had held that pension benefits earned prior to the marriage could not be included when calculating the husband's monthly income, which Justice Magnuson deemed to be properly considered as "income" when they are received and, therefore, can be used in calculating maintenance obligations.

Dissenting Decision

Justice Magnuson's dissent came in an insurance coverage case in General Casualty Company of Wisconsin v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2009). Like the statute of limitations case from Arkansas this, too, was before the Supreme Court on a certified question. U.S. District Court Judge Richard Kyle of Minnesota certified to the Supreme Court whether a declaratory judgment action of trademark infringement fell within the "advertising injury" coverage under a pair of liability policies.

The Supreme Court held that both policies covered the trademark infringement claim, one as a "misappropriation," and the other as an "advertising idea." Two of the justices did not take part in the case and one concurred.

But Justice Magnuson did not agree with the majority and issued a solitary dissent in which he "disagreed with the logic of the majority line of cases," was flawed by inappropriately "linking analogies," to find coverage.

Criminal Cases

Justice Magnuson wrote a pair of decisions for the court upholding first-degree premeditated murder cases. In State v. Fort, 768 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 2009), he wrote for a unanimous court affirming a first-degree premeditated murder conviction arising out of a jury decision in Hennepin County in a highly publicized stabbing death of an 11-year old boy in North Minneapolis after a break-in. Justice Magnuson upheld the admissibility of DNA evidence obtained during a second search of the suspect's home because the trial judge "had a substantial basis to feel that new evidence would be found" after the first search was unproductive.

While affirming the murder conviction, a parallel conviction for first degree murder while committing a burglary was vacated because, as the state conceded, "a defendant may only be convicted for one count of first-degree murder in connection with one murder."

Another first-degree conviction from Hennepin County District Court involving a notorious North Minneapolis murder was affirmed by Justice Magnuson in State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 2010). The defendant was charged and convicted with aiding and abetting first degree murder as part of a gang under Minn. Stat. § 609.229.

Justice Magnuson upheld the ruling, including the admissibility of gang evidence, by a "gang expert" with the Minneapolis Police Department. The testimony was appropriate because the trial judge limited it to "the most general terms ... supplemented by specific factual evidence from lay witnesses." The testimony helped describe gang culture generally and the role of retaliation in gang culture.

A claim of prosecutorial misconduct also was rejected, even though the prosecutor's closing argument "was disparaging and improper." It was not reversible because there was "ample evidence" that supported [the] conviction ... and the misconduct was sporadic, minimal, and rectified" by repeated warnings by the judge to the jury. Nor was a sentence of life imprisonment violative of the "cruel or unusual punishment" provision of Article I, Section 5, of the Minnesota State Constitution. The language of that provision differs slightly from the parallel provision of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which bars "cruel and unusual" punishments. While the core language in the Minnesota State Constitution "provides more protection" than the Federal Constitution, life imprisonment in this case was not cruel or unusual because of the proportionality of the crime to the punishment.

But Justice Magnuson did not always affirm criminal convictions, as reflected in State v. Lopez, 2010 WL 455288 (Minn. 2010). In a pair of consolidated cases this winter, the Court considered whether two defendants convicted in Todd County District Court of aiding and abetting in a drug crime should be required to register as predatory offenders under Minn. Stat. § 243.166 because the offenses occurred in connection with kidnapping.

Reversing the Court of Appeals, 764 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. App. 2009) and 2009 WL 749007 (Minn. App. 2009) (unpublished), Justice Magnuson ruled that the defendants were not required to register because the conviction of kidnapping did not arise out of the "same set of circumstances," which triggers registration requirements under the statute. The kidnapping charge, which was later dismissed, arose ten days after the events giving rise to the drug conviction, occurred in a different place, and involved a slightly different group of people. While the two offenses may share "related circumstances," that does not suffice to meet the statutory standard of the "same set of circumstances."

Justice Magnuson's short tenure as Chief Justice will probably be most noted for his zealous advocacy for those who populate the judicial system, including lawyers, judges, and other court room personnel and those they represent and serve. But, as these decisions reflect, he also should be remembered for his judicial craftsmanship on a wide variety of subjects.